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The Guidelines reflect a policy decision that computer-implemented
inventions require both hardware and software elements. This policy
decision and definition present several important issues. First, do the
Guidelines accurately reflect and accommodate the practices of the
software industry and software engineers? Second, do the Guidelines
accurately reflect the current case law?
I. EXISTING POLICY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP
TO SOFrWARE ENGINEERING
The policy of requiring that a computer-implemented invention be
claimed as a combination of both hardware and software does not accu-
rately reflect and accommodate the practices of the software industry
and software engineers. As a result, the scope of claims to computer
implemented invention may not be commensurate with the actual in-
ventions and thereby would not provide the correct level of protection.
Computer-implemented creations, inventive and otherwise, can be
broadly classified into three categories:
(1) Systems: executable computer applications embedded in
computer hardware providing a complete "system";
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(2) Applications: executable computer applications independent
of computer hardware and executed on conventional computer
hardware; and
(3) Tools: software code, object, kernel libraries, or other pure
software entities used to create, augment, or improve computer
systems and applications but, in themselves, not designed as ex-
ecutable systems or applications.
The second category includes both consumer and custom software
applications that are provided or purchased in executable form. The
third category includes application development environments, pro-
gramming tools, software developer kits, and all other forms of software
that are used to create computer-implemented creations in the first and
second category. I will call inventions in the second and third categories
"software-implemented inventions" in order to distinguish them from
"computer-implemented inventions" that have been defined to incorpo-
rate hardware.
It is the increasing sophistication of software in the third category
that makes possible the expanding variety and presence of computer-
implemented creations in the first two categories. The growing avail-
ability of powerful or pervasive computing devices alone is not
sufficient to sustain the growth of computer-implemented creations;
there must be the software tools in place that enable powerful, sophisti-
cated computer programs and systems to be readily and efficiently
developed, marketed, and maintained.
However, the policy underlying the Guidelines reflects a bias to-
ward the first category of computer-implemented inventions. As a
result, it constrains the patentability of the second (and particularly the
third) categories of software implemented creations by imposing a re-
quirement on claims to inventions in these categories that does not
reflect software engineers' understanding of their inventions. The re-
quirement is that the claims must be artificially limited to a hardware
embodiment even though what the inventor conceived of and created is
independent of, though used on, some computer hardware. The Guide-
lines should employ a definition of the non-hardware elements of a
computer implemented invention that properly captures the various lev-
els and types of software entities and that allows inventions at these
various entities to be properly claimed as statutory subject matter.
I will not address computer-implemented inventions in the first
category since these may be claimed in a manner consistent with both
the underlying policy of the Guidelines and what is actually invented. I
will address the impact of the Guidelines' policy on software-
1995-1996] Response to Guidelines for Computer-Implemented Inventions 105
implemented inventions in the second and third categories-meaning
either an executable computer program or a set of software tools or code
library that can be used to create executable applications. In both cate-
gories, the computer hardware is merely the mechanism of execution
and is not properly considered, from a software engineering view, as
part of a software creation or, as the Guidelines state, "what the appli-
cant has invented."'
Most software engineers (those of skill in the art) identify the ar-
chitecture of a typical computer program, code or object library,
application programming interface, and the like as an interrelated set of
modules, object classes, data structures, functions, and so forth. These
various software entities can be described by their structural (data and
inter-module associations), dynamic (state-oriented), or functional
(procedural) features. In the design of a computer program, code library,
and the like, there is typically no need to expressly model computer
hardware as part of the software design. The structural features are gen-
erally logical ones and are typically disclosed in a software patent
application by way of block diagrams showing relationships between
modules and information or event flow. The dynamic or functional fea-
tures of a module are typically disclosed by way of flowcharts, data-
flow diagrams, and event traces.
The problem that arises if a strict hardware-plus-software rule is
imposed is this: a purely software-implemented invention would have to
include, under the Guidelines, computer hardware elements in the claim
language to be considered an article of manufacture or machine, or else
it would be limited to a method claim. This produces an anomalous re-
sult for second and third category software-implemented inventions.
For an example of software inventions in the second category, as-
sume a common type of software patent application--one that describes
an executable computer program providing certain types of analysis or
transformation of data. Examples include computer-aided design tools,
financial analysis tools, and databases. Now assume a claim is written
for such a computer program that casts the invention as "a computer
system" and, in the body of the claim, recites selected modules of the
computer program. Assume further that there is no recitation of a proc-
essor, memory, display, input/output device, or other conventional
hardware since, to the inventor, the essence of the invention from which
all of the "specific utility" derives is the organization and operation of
the software. Assume further that the claim distinctly describes the in-
vention such that one of skill in the art would understand the claim and
1. 60 Fed. Reg. 28,778 at 28,780 (proposed June 2, 1995).
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be able to determine whether it reads on a particular computer program.
Thus, the claim would serve its ultimate purpose of notifying others of
the scope of the applicant's invention. However, under the Guidelines,
the recitation of the modules would not recite any "physical element,"
and the claim would be rejected as non-statutory.
Is this the proper result? Should the Examiner strictly abide by the
Guidelines, or may the Examiner impute, as one of skill in the art
would, that the modules are executed by the processor and thereby de-
fine a statutory machine?
Alternatively, what problems arise if a processor, storage device, or
the like is included in the claims? First, the claim does not define what
the applicant invented. The applicant invented software and did not con-
sider the invention to be a computer system, a combination of hardware
and software. In my experience, where claims to software invention
were always written to incorporate the computer hardware, I have had to
consistently explain to the software-engineer inventors why "all that
hardware" is included in the specification and the claims. Second, the
scope of protection is limited to a complete system. The patentee can
only sue one who "copies" the software portion as a contributory in-
fringer, with the resulting additional complexity in the litigation. The
form of the invention should dictate the patentee's enforcement options.
Next, there are article of manufacture claims. The Guidelines define
an article of manufacture for computer-implemented inventions as:
(1) a computer-readable storage medium, such as a memory de-
vice, a compact disc or a floppy disk; and
(2) the specific physical configuration of the substrate of the
computer-readable storage medium that represents data (e.g., a
computer program), where the storage medium so configured
causes a computer to operate in a specific and predefined man-
2
ner.
The first requirement is conceptually non-problematic.,The second
requirement is more difficult since it does not use the appropriate level
of conceptualization of the software. The "specific physical configura-
tion" of the substrate that "causes a computer to operate in a specific
and predefined manner" is not what the inventor invented and is often
not known to the inventor. That is, how a computer program is stored on
a floppy diskette (the particular arrangement of object code in this or
that sector) is not known, not descriptive of the invention, and not rele-
vant to the invention.
2. Id.
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What is relevant is the specific logical or physical relationship of
the elements of the computer program to each other, not to the substrate.
The substrate, the computer readable medium, is merely the medium of
operation and transmission. To predicate patentability on the configura-
tion of the substrate rather than the configuration of the software denies
the significance of the software entities as meriting protection as inven-
tions in and of themselves.
The problem with the Guidelines' presumptions is even worse for
software-implemented inventions in the third categories: software code
libraries, kernels, application programming interfaces, and other tools
that, in and of themselves, are not executable computer applications but
are rather the nuts and bolts that software engineers can use to create
computer-implemented systems and applications.
For these software inventions a "computer system" type claim is not
meaningful. What the applicant invented is a particular set of code ob-
jects, interfaces, data structures, functional procedures, or the like that
are not a computer system but rather aid in the creation of a variety of
different computer systems that have certain structural or procedural
features defined by the invented software entity. A "computer system"
claim incorrectly defines the invention since the invention is not a com-
puter system. It likely too narrowly defines the invention since it may
describe the system at a level that does not properly capture the utility
of the code library, code object, or other entity but only captures the
utility of a complete system. Finally, it suffers from even worse en-
forcement problems since the patentee would have to sue the final
user/maker/seller of a computer system having computer codes that in-
clude the software entity and can, again, only sue the "real" infringer for
contributory infringement or inducement. This results in a very complex
enforcement problem for the patentee.
Article of manufacture claims are, again, not useful for protection
here. As before, it places the cart before the horse: the invention is not
the floppy but what is stored on it. Second, even when claimed on a
storage medium, a code library stored thereon does not in and of itself
"cause[] a computer to operate in a specific and predefined manner"3
since the code library, as including source code or even compiled object
code, does not execute on its own, but rather is intended to be integrated
with other codes that will cause the operation of a computer in a specific
manner.
An analogy will illustrate the problems with the existing presump-
tions when applied to software-implemented inventions. Second
3. Id.
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category software inventions-application level software-are the
equivalent of automobile engines, while third category software inven-
tions are the nuts and bolts used to build the engines. "Computer
system" claims requiring hardware elements are like "machine claims"
for engines to be cast as, "[a]n automobile, comprising: . . . wheels;
tires; ... and an engine." The invention is the engine, not the car, but
could not be so claimed. If an applicant did this for an actual improved
engine, the PTO would likely issue a rejection or restriction require-
ment. Continuing the analogy for third category software, the claim for
an improved nut, piston, cam-shaft, etc. as a "automobile" would be
even more obviously incorrect.
Finally, method claims do not satisfy any of the problems identified.
Method claims create problems in enforcement. Who is the infringer?
The end user of the software? The company that creates the code? A
developer who embeds code in an application? Method claims also cre-
ate problems of breadth and scope. What elements are required to be
present in a computer program or code library in order to infringe the
method?
I1. SOFr ARE livPLEMENTED INVENTIONS
THEMSELVES ARE STATUTORY
It is respectfully submitted that allowing claims to software-
implemented inventions as themselves does not produce excessively
broad claims or render claims indeterminable as to their scope and
would not expand § 101 beyond the scope intended by Congress. Such
software-implemented inventions could be claimed, preferably as arti-
cles of manufacture in the absence of a "computer readable medium."
As noted above, the Guidelines already state that "computer pro-
gram-related elements" of a computer-implemented invention may
serve as the underlying structure in support of means for claims.4 Since
means-plus-function claiming is merely a formalism, it follows that the
Guidelines already comprehend that software entities may provide the
sufficient structural features to provide support for apparatus and article
of manufacture claims. It is recommended then that the Guidelines
make explicit what is already suggested: that software implemented in-
ventions may be properly classified as statutory machines or articles of
manufacture.
First, software engineers of ordinary skill in the art understand that
software must execute on a computer and that the failure to disclose or
4. Id. at 28,779.
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claim a computer processor or a computer readable medium does not
render a claim overly broad or indefinite. For software-implemented
inventions, a disclosure of structural and functional features of the soft-
ware entity and a claim directed to those structural or functional features
would, in the typical case, be readily determinable in terms of scope and
breadth. That is, a claim to a software application, code module or ob-
ject, data structure, interface, and so forth as an article of manufacture
would still have distinctly claimed the structural or functional features
of the software and, in doing so, would likely be written at the same
level of description as is commonly understood and used by software
engineers to describe their creations. It is likely that such a claim would
be even easier to interpret than a claim drafted in the form under the
Guidelines since the applicant need not couch the claim as including
hardware elements and interrelating those hardware elements with soft-
ware elements in order to avoid mere aggregation. Leaving out the
conventional hardware elements, which are assumed by software engi-
neers, allows the claim to focus more precisely on what the applicant
invented rather than on claim-drafting formalisms.
Second, it is submitted that software in and of itself is a member of
the class of "anything under the sun that is made by man."' While soft-
ware may, on one level, be considered "intangible," it does not fit in any
of the three categories to be explicitly identified as non-patentable: laws
of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. Software clearly is not
a "law of nature" or a "natural phenomena." Where most resistance is
found is the belief that software is an "abstract idea."
Now, it is true that computer science, as a theoretical discipline, op-
erates on and describes logical entities defined by logical or
mathematical principles. But in this regard, computer science is no dif-
ferent than quantum mechanics or other areas of physics which rely
inherently on highly complex mathematical models to describe and de-
fine reality and which attempt to prove the existence of particles or
phenomena by computation. Yet, this no more makes computer pro-
grams or code abstract than it makes quarks, leptons, or wavelets
abstract because they are defined by complex equations in quantum me-
chanics.
For example, a stack is a well-defined and, by now, conventional
"data structure." Like a simple circuit, it has a particular structure and a
particular set of procedures that define its operation. It is man made; it
does not define a law of nature or a natural phenomena. Is it an abstract
idea? A stack is abstract only to the extent that we may attempt to prove
5. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
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something about its operation as a matter of logical deduction or com-
putation. Similarly, a sorting algorithm is an abstract idea to the extent
we analyze its efficiency and other properties. But, a Boolean circuit
comprising only a series of NOR gates and tested for the validity of its
operation is also abstract and, yet, non-controversially statutory. To the
extent that a particular stack is defined to cooperate with other particular
entities in a particular manner, it no longer has merely abstract proper-
ties but rather is now a part of a larger structural description of a
machine or part thereof.
The problem with software is that the symbolic collapses with the
physical. Software is a symbolic structural or procedural definition of a
machine or machine component, but it is a definition of a machine
nonetheless. This is the wisdom of In re Alappat:
We have held that such programming creates a new machine,
because a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special
purpose computer once it is programmed to perform particular
functions pursuant to instructions from program software.6
The Alappat court was apparently thinking only of second category
software, but the same is true of third category software. Software
changes the general purpose computer to a special purpose computer
because it imposes a particular structural and functional arrangement on
the processor and memory. But, the processor and memory are merely
the mechanisms that instantiate a particular instance of the symbolically
defined machine or component. In the absence of software, a general
purpose processor and memory is static, of little interest, and of no util-
ity. How many businesses or individuals purchase computers merely to
have them sit dormant on a desk? It is the software that defines the use-
ful machine, not the machine that defines the software.
In the final analysis, the fundamental questions for software inven-
tions really should be ones of enablement, written description, and
distinct claiming. A proper written description will establish what the
invention was at the time of filing and, in particular, will support the
distinctive claiming of the software invention over the prior art. An ena-
bling disclosure will define the specific structural, dynamic, and/or
functional features that must be present to provide the "specific utility"
to the invention. These features would, under the Guidelines, be incor-
porated as limitations of the claims. If these criteria are met, then others
may practice the software invention by a particular embodiment. They
then may surmise which software systems, applications, or tools in-
fringe and which do not.
6. 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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Returning then to the specific language of the Guidelines, the fol-
lowing recommendations are suggested:
(1) If it is decided that computer-implemented inventions must
incorporate both hardware and software, then the presumption
for computer-programmed apparatus as statutory machines
should specifically state that at least one computer hardware
element operating under the control of, or configured by, a
computer program must be recited in the body of the claim.
(2) If it is decided that software alone is a sufficient structure,
then the presumptions should indicate that the elements recited
in the body of the claim may correspond to specific computer
program elements disclosed in the specification. This would al-
low software claims to be directed to a precise and distinct
structural or functional description of the software. This would
further allow, but not require, the recitation of hardware ele-
ments in the preamble, which are operated upon by software
elements in the body. The claim, however, would be limited to
the software elements for purposes of scope and interpretation.
